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Highly Reliable PUFs for Embedded Systems, Protected Against Tampering

Abstract : Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are well-known to be solutions for silicon-level anti-copy applications. However, as they are sensitive components, they are the obvious target of physical attacks. Thus, they shall be well protected. In this work we discuss the use case of key generation with a Loop PUF. We discuss the Loop PUF's efficiency and efficacy. We analyze it with respect to several known attacks like sidechannel and machine learning attacks, and show that in all considered cases it either natively resists or can be protected. We also show that perturbation attempts should be within the scope of likely attacks, hence the PUF shall be protected against tampering attacks as well. Also for this attack scenario we highlight the salient features of the Loop PUF and explain how its mode of operation natively empowers it to resist such attacks.
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https://hal-cnrs.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03783308
Contributor : Sylvain Guilley Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, September 22, 2022 - 10:11:36 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 17, 2022 - 3:53:09 AM

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Jean-Luc Danger, Sylvain Guilley, Michael Pehl, Sophiane Senni, Youssef Souissi. Highly Reliable PUFs for Embedded Systems, Protected Against Tampering. Industrial Networks and Intelligent Systems, 379, Springer International Publishing, pp.167-184, 2021, Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-77424-0_14⟩. ⟨hal-03783308⟩

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