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A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confi dence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game

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Luigi Butera
  • Function : Author
Philip J Grossman
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 1150373
Daniel Houser
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 1150374
John A List
  • Function : Author

Abstract

Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers and journals' incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications. We analyze a novel, decentralized approach promoting replications through beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We highlight the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission to journals, and demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation in public goods games, a pervasive feature but largely unexplored in the literature.
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Dates and versions

hal-03725592 , version 1 (17-07-2022)

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  • HAL Id : hal-03725592 , version 1

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Luigi Butera, Philip J Grossman, Daniel Houser, John A List, Marie Claire Villeval. A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confi dence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game. 2022. ⟨hal-03725592⟩
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