Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year :

Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game

(1)
1
Meziane Privat
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 1061824

Abstract

To predict the behavior of a population game when time becomes very long, the process that characterizes the evolution of our game dynamics must be reversible. Known games satisfying this are 2 strategy games as well as potential games with an exponential protocol. We will try to extend the study of infinite horizons for what are called symetric strategy games.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
article 1.pdf (308.06 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)

Dates and versions

hal-03843922 , version 1 (09-11-2022)
hal-03843922 , version 2 (04-01-2023)

Identifiers

Cite

Meziane Privat. Infinite horizon for symetric strategy population game. 2022. ⟨hal-03843922v1⟩
52 View
8 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More